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Recent Books
Book Reviews
A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE. By Richardo. Lempert
and Stephen A. Saltzburg. St. Paul: West. 1977. Pp. lvi, 1231.
$21.95

Teaching law through the use of appellate court opinions was
pedagogically sound in Langdell's day. It is still sound. Its basic
objectives remain the same: to force the student to think, to analyze
fact situations and decisions based on those situations, and to
synthesize rather than repeat rules. 1 The student is encouraged to
state clearly and concisely complicated statements of fact and to
separate habitually the material from the immaterial, the significant
from the superficially relevant. In short, in the best sense of that
much overworked and abused phrase, the student is encouraged to
"think like a lawyer."2
The skilled case-method teacher uses cases .to acquaint the student
not only with characteristic legal problems and with the principles
upon which the courts rely or purport to rely, but also with the
methods which judges and lawyers use in dealing with fact situations
and in reaching decisions usable as precedent. · The effective casemethod teacher places the student in the position of the lawyer presenting the facts giving rise to the decision and of the judge who
must decide that case or the next one. 3
When used in some courses and taught by one skilled in its use,
the case method accomplishes its objectives. Sometimes, and with
greater frequency in some courses than in others, it fails mis.erably.
One of the courses in which it frequently fails is Evidence. Perhaps
evidence teachers as a rule are not as good at the case method as
their colleagues. This is an unlikely explanation and one that is not
1. Langdell himself viewed law as a science, consisting of principles and doctrines. "To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes
a true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student of law." C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON mE LAW OF CoNTR.Acrs vi (1871).
2. "[l]t is by the study of cases that one is to acquire the power of legal reasoning, discrimination and judgment, qualities indispensable to the practicing lawyer ••.." Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 A.B.A. REP. 473,
489 (1894).
3. See discussion in Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL Enuc. 379, 384
(1952).
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satisfactory, at least to an evidence teacher. There are other, more
likely to be controlling, reasons for its ineffectiveness.
First, there are relatively few meaty appellate court opinions
dealing with questions of evidence. Most evidentiary questions are
decided, finally and irrevocably, at the trial court level-almost invariably without written opinion. Many evidence decisions are
within the discretion of the trial judge and are unlikely to be disturbed by the appellate court. Many evidentiary rulings, although
on nondiscretionary matters, involve too little of the total picture of
the trial of the case to be of controlling interest to the appellate court.
Perhaps more significantly, many of the critical evidentiary decisions are not made by judges at all. They are made by trial lawyers
who must, at least initially and often finally, decide what role the
rules of evidence are to play in the trial. A lawyer may decide not
to bother to object to leading questions, opinions, or even hearsay,
simply because the answers elicited from the witness are causing no
harm. He or she may carefully lay a foundation for the introduction
of a document, knowing all of the requirements necessary for admission, so as to avoid dispute in the courtroom. If the foundation is
incomplete and an objection is made, the lawyer may be able to supply the missing links without the need for a determinative court ruling, thus eliminating any need for appellate court supervision.
Second, those -appellate court opinions which may be useful to
a case method teacher may not be used by the teacher in a way that
emphasizes the significance of the methodology of the trial lawyer.
Edmund M. Morgan, a great evidence teacher and scholar, commented:
[A] proper use of the case method will make the student realize
that the reported case is a refined product, and that much, if not
most, of the lawyer's effective work must be done before and at
the trial. The instructor may put, and should encourage the student
to construct and consider, numerous situations that might have been
shown to exist upon proper investigation or that might have been
created at the trial. 4
Morgan was surely right, and yet it is enormously difficult to put
a student into the role of the trial lawyer when the decision of the
appellate court appears in front of him or her. It takes an evidence
teacher of considerable skill consistently to take the student out of
the appellate court and into the trial and pre-trial decision stage.
Third, evidence taught by the case method is usually not as
exciting as it should be. The courtroom is a fascinating place, both
to those who have been lucky enough to have been there as advocates and to those who see themselves as being there in the future.
4. Id. at 388-89.
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That fascination, and its impact on student motivation, is a factor
which should not be ignored in an evidence course. Again, the skillful case-method teacher can make anything interesting. Yet, most
law students tend to treat the matter just as any other case material
and fail to see the drama of the courtroom emerging from it.
Finally, the case method is a poor mechanism for dealing with
the questions of advocacy inherent in an evidence course. Dean
Leon Green said that "advocacy is the lawyer's distinctive power"
and has emphasized the usability of cases to aid in the development
of advocacy skills. 5 Indeed, appellate advocacy is in fact emphasized
by the traditional use of cases. But advocacy at the trial level is
seldom considered in a case-method course. Trial advocacy is more
than mere marshaling of facts and legal arguments. It involves certain distinctive skills in the presentation of evidence through the
testimony of witnesses and through tangible exhibits. Trial advocacy
cannot and should not be fully taught in an evidence course. Nevertheless, an exposure to advocacy skills can only serve to enhance the
students' appreciation of evidentiary issues.
One solution to the deficiencies of the case method in evidence
courses is the use of problems-written hypothetical fact situations
usually set in the trial court. Carefully constructed problems should
pose for the students questions of the same nature as those that might
be answered in a series of cases. What are the legal principles involved? How do judges and lawyers go about resolving the issues
raised? Indeed, the ultimate goal of the problem method is the
same as that of the case method-teaching legal principles and
methods and developing legal reasoning, discrimination, and judgment. But problems place the student in the trial court setting and
can simulate the excitement of the trial court, thus raising questions
of both evidence and advocacy from the perspectives of the trial
lawyer and judge.
The most difficult problem with the problem method is providing the student with enough information about the relevant legal
rules. Just having the students create legal rules and develop what
in their minds is the ideal trial might be interesting, but would not
be useful in getting the students to know some legal principles and
in causing them to appreciate the existing system. Information
about the current state of the law must be provided. This, of course,
is a problem not faced by the case method. Enough information
is contained in the opinions from which the standardized rulings of
the courts can be synthesized. Cases can be supplemented by court
rules and statutes.
The information dilemma inherent in the problem method can
be solved in a number of ways. Students can be sent to the law
5. Green, Advocacy and Case Study, 4 J.

LEGAL

Eouc. 317 (1952).
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library to research each problem. Although this method may be
ideal from a standpoint of learning the material involved in a single
·or small group of problems, it is entirely too time consuming to be
workable in teaching a broad body of legal principles. Moreover,
most law libraries simply do not have the facilities to permit such
a method to be used by more than a handful of students.
Another technique, which this author believes he uses with some
success, is to use a standard text, McCormick's second edition, and
a copy of the Federal Rules of Evidence as source materials. 0
Students can acquire enough information from these sources on
how courts have treated and will treat various evidentiary problems
to have an authoritative basis for answering the questions posed.
The hornbook and rules can be supplemented by photocopies of a
few key cases.
Lempert and Saltzburg use still another approach to presenting
the student with information to be used in the solution of problems.
The idea is both sound and ambitious. Not only are the students
given an exhaustive set of problems dealing with most of the critical
points in the law of evidence, but the book also contains enough
other material for the student to base his or her answer on established authority. The authors have carefully written an excellent
text. Where useful court decisions exist, they have made use of
these decisions as the basis for analysis and synthesis of legal
doctrine. The student need not ever leave the book itself to have
a sufficient background to resolve the issues raised in the problems.
The problems are appropriate. The student is usually placed in
the position of the trial lawyer or judge. Most problems are difficult in the sense that the answer is not obtained simply by reference
to a single line of text or a single phrase in an opinion set out in
the text. Many of the problems contain no "right" answer, but much
room is left for discussion. The authors do take positions with regard to several controversies existing among evidence scholars.
However, nowhere are those positions presented in such a way as
to lull an alert student into an unquestioning acceptance of the
"house" solution.
The authors also make effective use of actual court transcripts
and pose many problems based upon these records. This approach
permits the student to see problems as they arise in the context of
an actual trial. The use of records also takes maximum advantage
of the motivational aspects of the problem method. Students reading a full court transcript can see the development of an entire case
and are better able to observe the lawyer's role in the proceedings.
The transcript contained in Chapter Nine dealing with the develop6. K.

BROUN &
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ment of a record-aptly subtitled "The Lawyer as an Artist"-is particularly useful. The transcript is of a rape prosecution, and it presents challenging constitutional and nonconstitutional evidentiary
questions. Both witness testimony and argument by counsel are
included. Its placement in the book calls for its consideration after
the student has been exposed to many of the significant evidentiary
issues. It should be used as placed in order to permit the student
to reinforce and build upon his or her understanding of those issues.
There will be some difficulties with this book for less experienced law teachers. First, the problem method itself necessarily
demands maximum preparation. The ideal case-method teacher
prepares for his or her class by considering all of the problems that
may be raised, by mentally quarreling with all of the opinions, and by
placing himself or herself in the position of the lawyers who brought
the case either at trial or on appeal. However, sometimes a particular
opinion will be so obvious in its statement and the reasoning so
succinctly laid out that the temptation exists simply to prepare to
present that reasoning. All law teachers would concede the inadequacy of that kind of preparation; all of us have done it to one degree
or another in the course of any semester. In contrast, the problemmethod teacher must prepare to solve each problem. An excellent
teacher's manual such as the one prepared by Lempert and Saltzburg
is a useful crutch. However, it is unlikely that the teacher can fully
appreciate the authors' suggestions without first engaging in a diligent, searching inquiry into the issues raised.
Lempert and Saltzburg, as is the case with many good casebooks
and most problem books, also presents difficulties of selection, organization, and time management. The book contains a great many
problems, far more than could ever be fully covered in a three- or
even four-hour course. The teacher must carefully select the problems to be covered and the text to be discussed. Some of the subject matter dealt with in the book should be covered outside of class
by having the students read the material and work the problems to
their own satisfaction. Other problems must be covered in detail
by class discussion.
The very effectiveness of the problem method makes the selection and organization process even more perplexing. The students
will be motivated; they will come up with their own answers to problems rather than simply repeating some textbook answers. All of
this will be time consuming. Some of the discussions will take far
longer than the teacher will anticipate. The instructor must recog~
nize that if permitted to get out of hand and to lose its structure,
a problem-method class can go on forever. Careful time management, however, can minimize these difficulties.
The first chapter in Lempe:r.t and Saltzburg presents difficulties
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beyond those inherent in the problem method. In this chapter, the
authors attempt to provide an overview of the law of evidence by
the use of a transcript. Extensive textual footnotes supplement the
transcript. Following the transcript is a series of problems based
upon the principles involved. The central difficulty with this
approach is that the problems raised are too complex to be handled
in the cursory fashion intended by the authors. The authors obviously intend only to introduce the issues. Yet the student, because
of the very nature of the problem, is likely to become bogged down
in the detail involved. One the other hand, if he or she does not
become bogged down, it is unlikely that enough of an impression
about the evidentiary point raised will be made to be of any real
assistance.
Perhaps the first chapter is simply too ambitious. A transcript
might have been used; indeed, the existing transcript might still be
used, without an attempt to deal with the evidentiary issues. It is
useful at the beginning of the course for the student to see what
testimony looks like (at least in writing), to see what objections look
like, and to see what the trial as a whole involves. Reference back
to the transcript could then be made at other points in the course.
Another difficulty is the absence of a separate treatment of
direct examination. Most of the issues involved in direct examination are taken up in connection with other topics. Yet, the failure
to emphasize direct examination as a separate subject regrettably diminishes the importance of that critical aspect of the trial. The
separate treatment of issues like leading questions and opinion is
good but meets only part of the need. The student does need to
deal with a direct examination as it might be approached by a trial
lawyer. Somewhere in the book that specific problem should have
been raised.
Neither of these criticisms is intended to detract from the basic
validity of Lempert and Saltzburg as an effective tool for teaching
evidence. The idea of a self-contained problem, text, and casebook
is a brilliant one. It is executed by the authors with extreme care.
The book is a highly usable product.
Kenneth S. Broun
Professor of Law
University of North Carolina

